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One of the cornerstones of the analysis of the economic crisis that 
began in 2008 is the analysis and evaluation of the different crisis 
management methods employed by the Central and Eastern European 
countries. Several researchers have been addressing the problems of the 
crisis.1 However, most of these analyses are focusing on the antecedents 
and symptoms of the crisis, on the ways out via individual economic 
policies.2 Focusing on budgets and public finances, the present monograph 
examines the similarities and differences of the crisis management 
practices employed by those Central and Eastern European countries that 
accessed the European Union between 2004 and 2007 and that were 
formerly “socialist” with a so-called planned economy (the EU-10) in 
comparison to each other and to the European “core-countries.” We are 
                                                          
1 This monograph is focusing on these countries because the historical and 
economic positions of the two Mediterranean countries that accessed the EU at the 
same time belong to different geopolitical groups – according to the categorisation 
used in the EU – when compared to Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia that, after World War II, 
belonged to the same political and economic block and shared a similar fate; 
despite a number of similarities, Slovenia can be put into the category of the 
“socialist block”, with certain distinctions regarding its development course and 
inherited traditions. 
2 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. announced the greatest bankruptcy of economic 
history on September 15, 2008. Usually, this date is considered as the eruption of 
the crisis of the financial mediator systems. 
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presenting the fiscal policy steps that governments took by sorting them 
into so-called “action matrices.”3 
The “matrices” that sum up the characteristics of measures introduced 
at the eruption of the 2008 crisis and in 2010 and 2011 make the life cycles 
of the various measures traceable, whereas the analysis of the 
“condensation” of identities and differences helps to identify the 
characteristics of the different socio-economic traditions, public finance 
policies and governance models.  
Our attempt is not merely to present the trends of the identities and 
differences of the crisis management by using the methods referred to in 
the literature review and sorted according to EU categorisations; we also 
attempt to analyse to what extent the crisis management of the Central and 
Eastern European countries that accessed the EU later, 
 
• had a solid, theoretical grounding; 
• proved to be pro-active and preventive; 
• assisted in the re-structuring of social and economic services and 
the efficient operation of the large entitlement systems; and 
• provided a solid, harmonised regulatory and governance framework. 
 
In our conclusions, we are seeking to answer how, to what extent, and 
how separately, the crisis management by the Central and Eastern 
European countries has contributed to the stability of public finances, and 
whether the chosen solutions will be able to offer a sustainable, new 
development perspective by vitalising the economy or whether they will 
merely offer short-term relief. We tried to answer the question whether the 
crisis-related problems, by causing serious instability in certain countries, 
will deepen to the extent that they might endanger the sustainability of the 
European integration. 
2. The trend in public debt in the EU countries  
and in the EU-10 
The literature review on the topic shows that researchers agree that the 
financial crisis and the contraction of the economic performance have 
created a difficult situation regarding the sustainability of fiscal policies in 
every country of the European Union. Additionally, to a different extent in 
the different countries, new problems have emerged that can be traced 
                                                          
3 We are only summarising literature from the second half of 2011, ignoring the 
tabular, comparative summary of the measures taken (European Institute 2011). 
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back to the persistent imbalance of performance and consumption, the 
issues that have not been addressed for a long time, and structural 
deficiencies. With the crisis, these issues have become more exposed, and 
they show the constraints of public financing.4 
The performance of the economy and the extent of public financing, 
namely its functioning and the efficiency of the allocation of coherent 
expenditures and their structure will, always and in every country, 
mutually determine each other. Figures 8-1/a/b/c and 8-2 show the 




Fig. 8-1/a The amount and internal distribution of public expenditures in 2000 by 
country and EU-15 and EU-10 average, gross sum, in % of the GDP 
Source: Eurostat 
 
                                                          
4 Naturally, the articulation of the individual measures required simplifications and 
contractions that are based on focal points from the literature review. We are also 
aware that even a classification that considers most factors can only be accidental 
and that assigning other limits or categorisation would also be possible; it is also 
possible to believe that certain measures (“packages”) are “independent” from the 
crisis and “merely” reflect the “general” modernisation intention prevailing within 
public finance. 
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Fig. 8-1/b The amount and internal distribution of public expenditures in 2007 by 





Fig. 8-1/c The amount and internal distribution of public expenditures in 2011 by 
country and EU-15 and EU-10 average, expenditure gross sum in % of the GDP 
Source: Eurostat 
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Fig. 8-2 Public revenues, expenditures, and deficit trends in the EU-15 and EU-10 
countries, in % of the GDP 
Source: Eurostat 
 
As shown in Figure 8-2, the countries most affected by the crisis, the 
outdated structure of public expenditures and, most importantly, their 
unsustainable growth, played significant roles in the escalation of financial 
problems and the debt crisis (OECD 2010 and Inotai 2011). The 
transformation endeavours (modernisation, efficiency improvements) and 
the structural reforms that occurred in various short or long-term national 
government programmes have not resulted in radical changes. The ensuing 
and mostly campaign-like steps led to only a few and very different results 
in the different countries. However, it is worth analysing the reasons for 
the lack of significant results in more detail.  
When comparing the average financing ratios of Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia 
and Slovakia (EU-10) with those of the EU-15 group consisting of the 
former EU, it is notable that there are no significant differences in the 
various public finance structures that would determine the sustainability of 
the financing. Additionally, we should note that the sustainability of the 
more developed, yet similarly outdated social entitlement systems of the 
Baltic states, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, i.e., the majority of 
the later accessing European countries, requires less sacrifices than in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. The public finance structure in the 
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examined EU-10 group, partly due to the entitlements from the 
“socialistic” heritage, is rather rigid, and changing it significantly would 
require an emergency situation or the support of the society. The public 
finance structure has advanced, or rather inched forward, by changes 
affecting the total functioning of the state. In turn, social demand tends to 
result in over-consumption, inefficient but “familiar” social services, and 
qualitative improvements, not paying attention to the fact that the outdated 
financing system is leading to a path of deficits (Fig. 8-2); prior to the 
crisis, the individual countries have followed this path that they were 




Fig. 8-3 Trend of indebtedness in proportion to the GDP in the EU-10 and 
Northern, Western and Southern European countries (2000–2011) 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Due to the earlier evolving and deepening “financing gap,” the crisis 
affected the Central and Eastern European countries at the peripheries 
much more than the countries of Northern and Western Europe. In the first 
phase of the crisis, the situations of the EU-10 countries were in many 
aspects similar, as shown in Figure 8-3, before a relative improvement of 
the positions started. However, there were stability problems in the EU-10 
as well as in the Southern European countries, where governments have 
been financing social services that lagged far behind the performance of 
the real economy in respect to their structure, scope and quality 
(Csaba 2010). According to different authors, the present Euro crisis is 
first of all a budgetary and public debt crisis or, in other words, a sovereign 
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debt crisis, but one that affects only certain (southern) countries of the 
euro zone (Carmoy and Combes 2011 and Palánkai 2011). 
From the above, it can be concluded that, as a consequence of the 
convergence5 of basic social rights and demands, the welfare systems and 
institutional and entitlement models of the European Union countries are 
showing a number of similarities. At the same time, regarding the 
financing of these similar solutions, the differences were significant even 
prior to the crisis. Now, in light of the crisis – as we will show when 
discussing the crisis management measures – the different approaches that 
were directly related to the size of public finance, the structure of services 
financed by the public finance, the technical implementation of the 
entitlements and their sustainable financing and, thus, a given country’s 
inclination for crisis6 are called into question (Kovács 2011a and 
Muraközi 2012). 
When comparing the GDP proportionate budget deficit of the EU-27 in 
2009 to the pre-crisis years, it has nearly tripled to 6.8%, and the same 
development occurred in the Euro zone: the GDP proportionate budget 
deficit reached 6.3%. Budget surpluses disappeared in all countries, and 
only Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Luxemburg and Sweden 
performed below the 3% deficit threshold. The deficit level was 
approximately average in countries such as France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
                                                          
5 In the second decade of the 21st century there are four interlinked and 
consequential challenges seeking answers (Muraközy 2012). Namely: 
1. the lack of optimal-sized and affordable public services may result in 
losses that could 
2. make it difficult to keep up in the competition of social models and the 
global economy. This challenge, in the coming decades, will be coupled with 
3. changing demographic situations and, in a number of European 
countries, including Hungary, borrowing as a result of the postponement of 
reforms; social consumption that could not be financed from domestic resources 
and that was in no relation to the economic performance of the country resulted in 
the ensuing, differentiated 
4. debt crisis that caused serious burdens making recovery difficult not only 
among those countries directly affected, but also within the risk-sharing 
community of the European Union (Cipriani 2010). 
Among those challenges, in the coming decades, the management of the crisis and 
the challenges caused by demographic trends will receive most attention. Thus, it 
is not possible to employ action scenarios reflecting the traditional economic 
literature that emphasises economic development while maintaining social 
cohesion. 
6 Here we can refer to various norms, guidelines, and charters, but also to the fact 
that the Union identifies itself as a market economy, which is reflected, in different 
forms or wording, in the fundamental laws of the individual countries. 
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Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. With a 4.4% deficit, Hungary’s situation 
can be considered better than average.7 By 2009, the budget deficit of 
several countries was near to or even higher than 10%, which can be 
considered a crisis level. Among the Euro zone countries, Greece, with a 
deficit of 15.4%, Ireland (14.4%), Spain (11.1%) and Portugal (9.2%) 
were in such a crisis situation. Similarly, high deficits were observed in the 
United Kingdom (11.4%) and, among the examined Central and Eastern 





Fig. 8-4 Debt map of the European Union 
Source: MNB data 
 
The budget crisis continued in 2010–2011, and the average deficit of 
the EU-27 kept rising to 7.2%. In 2011, it was solely Sweden that 
produced a budget surplus (0.9%). The success of public finance 
stabilisation in seven countries, including three of the group of examined 
countries (Bulgaria, Germany and Hungary), that were able to reduce or 
stabilise their respective deficits in 2011 is conspicuous. Portugal (5.9%) 
as well as France, Poland and Slovenia (all 5.8%) had significant deficits. 
                                                          
7 Obviously, maintaining welfare and education systems with identical efficiency, 
scope, quality and availability essentially requires identical expenditures, whether 
they are financed by taxes, centralised redistribution or citizen’s income. Real 
differences are extorted by the differences of the economic performance. 
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Ireland (10.5%), Greece (9.5%), the United Kingdom (8.6%) and Spain 
(6.3%) were facing a grave situation.  
According to forecasts, the majority of the EU countries will be 
successful in significantly decreasing their budget deficits. Among the 
Central and Eastern European countries, a deficit surpassing the 3% limit 
can be expected in Poland and Slovakia. Their trends, however, indicate 
that the stabilisation results will approach those of the so-called core 
countries of the euro zone. None of the EU-10 countries belongs to the 
lagging Mediterranean group, although, concerning the sustainability of 
stability, as can be seen in the trend prognosis of economic growth and 
investments in Figure 8-5/a-b, they are in different positions. The level of 
their respective deficits can be attributed to one-time effects (e.g., 
in Hungary), to the curtailment of services without structural 
transformation (e.g., in Romania), or to the invariability of the inherited 
low level (e.g., Slovakia, the Baltic states, Romania). 
When searching for the causes of the growing national debt in the 
period of 2007–2011 (Fig. 8-6), concerning the EU-10, we can find several 
reasons. In the case of Romania and Poland, the 14.8% growth of national 
debt compared to the GDP can be explained entirely by the deterioration 
of the primary balance of the central budget, whereas, in the case of the 
Czech Republic, 13.7% of the 14.6% growth can be explained via that 
same reason. In the case of Lithuania, approximately half of the national 
debt deterioration can be explained by the deterioration of the primary 
balance. At the same time, in Hungary, the significant deterioration of the 
interest rate conditions for financing, the drop in the economic 
performance and the lagging speed of cost cuts8 were also responsible for 
the growing national debt. In the remaining countries, a variety of other 
causes for debt deterioration were found. All these causes show that 
without a transformation of public finance structures, it would be difficult 
to achieve sustainable financing. However, as shown in Figures 8-1/a-c, 
only moderate results were achieved in this field. 
 
                                                          
8 Most scholars accepted the favourable Hungarian deficit indicators because they 
were realised by using the share of the private pension fund above HUF 500 billion 
and by using other, non-recurring measures. At present, there are no rules concerning 
the structural balance. The Maastricht criteria merely state that the deficit cannot be 
higher than 3% of the GDP. There is a significant difference between the Maastricht 
deficit and a “structural deficit.” Namely, the latter has to be adjusted by the so-called 
cyclical and non-recurring items; in our case, this would mean a 6–7% deficit. 
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Fig. 8-5/a Expected trend of GDP growth, investments and budget deficits in 2012 
Source: European Commission (2011) 
 
 
Fig. 8-5/b Forecast of the GDP growth, investments and budget deficits in 2013, in 
% of the GDP 
Source: European Commission (2011) 
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Fig. 8-6 Public finance deficit and public debt in the EU in 20129, in % of the GDP 
Source: European Commission (2011) and GKI Economic Research Co.  
Note: The lines within the diagram show the so-called Maastricht criteria. 
 
Declining investments observed in indebted countries lead to a lasting 
decline in growth, which also cannot be compensated by the low level of 
domestic demand. The chances of recovery from the crisis look 
particularly gloomy in countries where the debt service for the previously 
accumulated deficit, despite some successful corrections and even with a 
positive budget, is so high that following the implementation of current 
financing restrictions, there is not enough money, and investments in 
infrastructure developments keep being postponed (see, for example, 
Hungary). This development, in turn, will reduce the chances for growth, 
even in the short run. 
                                                          
9 “Reflexivity” is a concept promoted by George Soros. In his opinion, the balance 
of the market is the result of the continuous interaction of the subjective decisions 
by the actors of the market and the fundamentals of the market; thus, he rejects the 
theoretical principle that had been tacitly accepted in the course of the governance 
of the international financial system, according to which money markets are 
always aiming at a balanced position. During the crisis, investors and market 
analysers have exposed themselves as commentators serving their own interests 
and striving for influence in the processes. The world economy has been drifting 
and cannot provide an answer to the emerging social issues yet. At the same time, 
the whole European economy governing system is quietly moving towards 
centralisation and protection under the slogan of “let’s save what can be saved.” 
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Financing is influenced by the bankruptcy risk rating of the given 
country and by the costs of the external borrowing operations, the so-
called credit default swap (CDS) premiums.10 CDS premiums prevail via 
the strong fluctuation of securities market yields, and deviations are a sign 
of the fluctuating level of trust in the government policy of the given 
country. Figure 8-7 shows the aggregated, mutual effects of the securities 
market yields and political events11 (European Commission 2011 and 




Fig. 8-7 Security markets yields of the EU-10 countries and decisive political 
events and economic initiatives 
Source: Eurostat, OTP, own compilation 
                                                          
10 Naturally, even the possibilities of decreasing expenditures cannot be final, and 
the transformation of the public finance structure, in the beginning, tends to show 
growing expenditures. An analysis of these social connections (action brakes in 
governance), and budgetary policy is beyond the scope of this article. 
11 At the beginning of January 2012, the Hungarian Credit Default Swap (CDS) 
rate was 670 basis points, compared to 255 at the beginning of summer in 2011. In 
March 2009, at the time of the expansion of the global financial crisis following 
the collapse of the large American bank Lehman Brothers in the fall of 2008, and 
when Hungary was near bankruptcy, the CDS rate was 630 basis points. 
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3. Matrices of fiscal interventions and the ensuing 
consequences 
Shortly after the eruption of the Greek crisis, a number of leading 
economists called attention to the lack of economic policy harmonisation 
and the “softness” of the Stability and Growth Pact (Boefinger and 
Ried 2010). This situation implied that the member states would manage 
the effects of the economic crisis individually, which is what actually 
happened. Obviously, this led to a “mix of action scenarios” marked by 
significant randomness, instead of a scenario built on economic, social and 
political research. However, this approach also included some decisive 
elements that are prevailing in the long run. 
The employed solutions included a mixture of taxations, cost reductions, 
service cuts, restrictions, consumption reductions and economic stimulus. 
However, the proportions, timing or dosage were different, depending on 
the size of the given country, its economic strength, indebtedness, social 
traditions, feasibility or the preferences of the respective government. 
Obviously, the results were also different. The same solutions, for example 
the introduction of a modest income tax, in some countries led to an 
increase in domestic savings, whereas in other countries those were 
depleted or transferred abroad (Haan et al. 2002). 
The time that has passed since the eruption of the crisis can be divided 
into two phases: From 2008-2010, the first economic and political 
reactions indicated fundamentally similar situations in the individual 
countries. Regarding crisis management, maintaining the viability of the 
financial intermediary system was considered most important, followed by 
preventing economic decline. To this end, governments, if there was 
money for such measures, also tried to use appropriated stimulus funds. 
The EU-10 countries, however, did not have resources for the broad 
implementation of such solutions. 
The deepening of the crisis from 2010 onward led to the renewal of 
crisis management strategies, including the employed solutions. Trying to 
identify the fundamental, stable characteristics of the EU-27 crisis 
management and the differences of the two crisis phases, we can find them 
in the following 7 areas: 
 
• the prevailing reduction of public finance expenditures 
(restrictions) in both phases (in 2008–2010 and in 2011); 
• the general growth of taxes, duties and levies of contributions that 
can be found in both phases (2008–2010 and 2011); 
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• the interventions into the economy, primarily into the labour 
market, that prevailed in both phases (2008–2010 and 2011); 
• the selective reduction of taxes, duties and levies of contributions 
targeted at specific fields, characteristic primarily in the first phase 
(2008–2010); 
• individual bank rescue operations in the first phase (2008–2010); 
• changes to the operational rules, institutional systems and structures 
of public finance that generally prevailed in the first phase12 
(2008–2010), and 
• special taxes targeted at the financial sector, characteristic in the 
second phase of crisis management (2011). 
 
                                                          
12 A survey conducted by the European Committee in 2009 and encompassing 21 
member states emphasised the following (European Commission 2010b): 
• Among the countries that responded to the questionnaire, 19 often 
resorted to employing budgetary procedures as fiscal means that included the 
general curtailment of expenditures, building up bigger reserves and 
differentiated structural transformations.  
• 13 countries introduced new, numeric fiscal rules; 13 countries reported 
new fiscal frameworks.  
• In the given period, increasing transparency and the employment of the 
programs and the transformation of the budget process were characteristic. 
• Strengthening fiscal discipline (e.g., budget centralisation, top-down 
budget) scarcely emerged.  
• From among the 21 countries that responded, 19 introduced new fiscal 
rules, whereas 2 transformed the existing rules.  
• 8 new regulations were dealing with restricting the growth of 
expenditures, 6 were dealing with balanced budgets, and 5 focused on the debt 
level.  
• In the field of medium-term financial planning, ten countries witnessed 
both the transformation of the existing rules and the introduction of new 
regulations.  
• 3 countries introduced as a first step medium-term financial planning 
systems as means of emerging from the crisis; therefore, 25 EU member states 
have such systems. 
• Although several countries introduced new fiscal rules, the Council’s 
recommendations have not been largely reflected yet; progress has been 
reported only in 7 cases.  
Regarding this issue, the opinion of the European Committee is that 
additional/complementary fiscal incentives and initiatives are necessary. Fiscal 
regulations appeared strong enough only in 5 countries, which could lead to the 
conclusion that as long as the old structure can be financed, countries keep 
postponing the structural reform of public finance. 
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Additional measures are showing a rather mixed picture. The concerned 
countries regarded strengthening the monitoring of financial and economic 
processes, establishing supranational controlling and coordinating 
institutions, and the operation of these institutions as part of an early 
warning system as the best tools to prevent unexpected situations. The 
establishment of such a system, however, has been proceeding slowly and 
accompanied by debates (Moser 2011). At the same time, new advisory 
institutions with a specific control function have been formed, such as 
fiscal councils. By 2008, no such institution had been established among 
the EU-10 countries, but Hungary and Slovenia in 2009, Romania in 2010, 
and Slovakia in 2012 set up independent fiscal councils. 
With the exception of Hungary, the intensive phase of crisis 
management in the EU-10 countries, not unlike in the Northern and 
Western parts of the EU, occurred in the years 2008–2009. In the 
Mediterranean countries, the indecisiveness concerning interventions 
resulted in the escalation of the crisis.  
Considering the reasons and the feasibility of the intermediary 
“solutions” included in the “action scenario matrices,” they are related to 
the public finance balance, the production and welfare systems and the 
size of the challenge. Obviously, governmental action is more “activist”, 
both in terms of measure and expansion, in situations where the structural 
transformation of the welfare system made the decrease of public finance 
expenditures and their structural transformation more urgent. 
Naturally, the conditionalities (e.g., social, stability, political, economic, 
public administration) of similar mixes of action scenarios differ; thus, the 
mechanisms are also different from country to country. In other words, 
identical or very similar prescriptions and “dosages” of solutions or 
techniques might lead to different results.13 As such, it is difficult to draw 
generalised conclusions. However, even within the outlined limits, we can 
note that regarding the depth of the problems and crisis management 
activities it would be impossible to state that there is a significant 
relationship between a country’s size of public finance, its financing, and 
the inclination for a crisis. Considering the successful crisis management, 
                                                          
13 Answering these questions, namely why similar public finance governing and 
crisis solutions lead to different results in different EU countries, is beyond the 
limits of the present study; identifying the limits of creating a model in this respect 
would require additional research, involving many aspects of social studies such as 
the history of law, traditions, analysis of political, governance and management 
traditions as well as national characters. 
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or rather the absence of a crisis, in Slovenia,14 the Northern European 
countries and the examined Central and Eastern European block of 
countries and considering the significant expansion of these countries’ 
social services, we can conclude that the question is not in what model 
(type of state participation) entitlement systems can function, but whether 
they are functioning efficiently and whether their financing is in harmony 
with the performance of the economy. 
Comparing the matrices, it was clear that tax reductions were 
implemented as a stimulus for certain productive industries. Also, special 
taxes were introduced as part of a general increase in tax burdens. The 
introduction of special taxes (solidarity taxes) and tax exemptions in 
Hungary has not been a unique phenomenon in the course of crisis 
management. The extent (e.g., the significant reduction of personal income 
taxes and corporate taxes), the broad variety of implementation tools, and 
the fragmented nature of the tax system itself, were significantly different 
and more complicated.15 Regarding bank taxes, it is important to note that 
the concept itself has been used not only in countries belonging to the euro 
zone (Austria, France, Germany), but also in Hungary, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. At the same time, regarding the performance of the 
banking system, size indicators and the gross sum of revenues of the public 
finances of the countries that reported a resource surplus (and partial 
correction of the division of burdens) to ensure a balanced budget, the 
solution employed in Hungary was incomparably more radical then the 
measures introduced in other countries and of a magnitude that might 
endanger the financing activity of the banking system and, also, economic 
growth.16 
                                                          
14 Contradictory information has been published about Slovenia recently, stating 
that it had accumulated many problems, that the economy was overheated prior to 
the crisis and that the current correction is belated; this information might imply 
the revaluation of the country’s role as a “star pupil.” 
15 Now, by making the conditionality of collection even harder, the trend of 
budgetary revenues is becoming disadvantageous, whereas leaving more income 
with the targeted section of the population – the so-called middle-class – did not 
result in significant saving surpluses, partly due to the decreasing of heavy 
indebtedness, partly due to lack of trust. 
16In the period of 2008-2011 – with the exception of bank consolidating actions – 
Hungary tried almost every step of fiscal policy, which, in some cases, represented 
the opposite of existing policies, administering major changes that resulted in 
shocks to the system. It was also obvious that, especially in an unstable 
environment, repeatedly opting for creative, non-orthodox solutions that had not 
been tried before and that were scarcely paying attention to the harmonisation of 
different interests had a higher risk of achieving the desired results. First, because 
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4. First phase of crisis management in the EU-10 
countries: 2008–2010 
Looking at the reaction to activities during the first phase, we can see 
that government rhetoric was emphasising the decreasing of the burdens of 
the real economy as well as the launching of economic development in the 
EU-10 countries (Table 8-1). However, the actions themselves were not 
consistent, partly due to a lack of resources and due to political 
fluctuations. Revenue concentration generally became more moderate. The 
dynamics of the welfare expenses of public finance have generally 
dwindled; occasionally, countries spent less on such expenses, also in 
absolute numbers. The general assumption was that even with an increase 
– in contrast to a selective reduction – of corporate taxes, more would 
remain for development and to support innovations indispensable for 
growth. However, this assumption applied only to the Baltic States and 
Poland, who are closest to the group of the Northern countries.17 
It is understandable that in every crisis where jobs are eliminated, the 
state tries actively to boost employment and offers support and training; 
thus, various labour-market programmes could be observed. One of the 
significant steps of the crisis management was a major decrease in, or even 
the elimination of, such “benefits” due to their welfare character, which 
lowered the labour-market participation of individuals. However, in 2009  
                                                                                                                         
the institutional system was bearing the burden and the responsibility of the 
international crisis management fearing the possible spreading of such 
“innovations” that might tear up cooperation, it was distrustful and ready to 
implement sanctions. Second, the rapidly changing conditions themselves pose a 
risk to feasibility. Creative ideas, if not tested for feasibility, sooner or later might 
become counter-productive and (might) lead to a diversion from the chosen 
scenario or make the goal unachievable, together with all the social and economic 
consequences. 
17 When experiencing the first signs of the crisis, the government of Lithuania 
made several, impressive promises, which included a whole range of measures: 
decreasing the salaries of senior officials and public servants, with the exception of 
teachers, increasing the value added tax, launching of employment protection 
programmes, and more (Hawkesworth et al. 2010). The government used the 
majority of the saved money for innovations and education because it considered 
these fields to be one of the most important engines of growth. As a 
counterexample, we can mention the case of the Czech Republic where, despite the 
increase of certain tax revenues (VAT, consumption taxes), the government did not 
pay much attention to supporting innovations and education; on the contrary, the 
amount of money spent on such purposes has decreased significantly (Hrdlicka et 
al. 2010). 
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and 2010, the incentive programmes started to get “exhausted” as a 
consequence of the restrictions of the fiscal leeway (European Commission 
2010a). The ineffective labour-market interventions, however, have not 
adequately recognised the dynamics of the deepening crisis and its effects 
on the structural transformation of the labour market. However, short-term 
governmental interests in maintaining social peace have also contributed 
to the contradictory character of the activities.18 
 
5. Characteristics of the second phase of crisis 
management 
 
The analysis showed that in the gripping global crisis, due to a lack of 
balance in world markets, earlier stimulus activities were not able to 
generate substantive growth. Thus, the effects of implemented measures 
have usually “lagged” behind the events, and stimulating the economy 
with public finance resources has also resulted in a transfer of market risks 
to the public sector. Therefore, after a certain period, when governments 
kept balancing public finances with new restrictions, the lessening of the 
burdens of the real sector was not able to boost growth in the real 
economy. Most countries that implemented economic stimulus measures 
saw their GDP deficit grow by 0.1-0.5%, which explains the complete 
disappearance of this solution from the crisis management toolbox 
(European Commission 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011). 
                                                          
18 Decreasing the various burdens of employees and employers represents an 
important measure to protect jobs. We find frequent examples illustrating this 
statement in the crisis management strategies of the countries addressed earlier: the 
wide-range measures taken in Slovakia included the partial or full overtaking of 
health insurance and pension contributions, the support of flexible working hours, 
the supervision of laws governing employment, and the saving of building 
construction jobs by government orders (Bucek 2010). In a similar way, Slovenia 
also spent a significant amount on protecting work places, on mitigating the effects 
of the crisis on businesses, as well as on increasing innovation and education 
expenses, similar to the above-mentioned case of the Baltic states (Beynet and 
Leibfritz 2009). In this respect, Poland has not been an exception either; as in the 
years prior to the crisis, it worked toward sustaining the domestic market and 
supporting the significant entrepreneurial layer of the society. This effort was 
manifested in the support of flexible working hours or the partial or full taking 
over of various contributions (Reichardt 2011). Drawing EU support in euros 
offered partial coverage to facilitate these actions; the favourably low exchange 
rate of the national currency as well as revenues from an increasing VAT have also 
served these purposes (Csomós 2011). 
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Within the EU member states, with the exception of Romania, Hungary 
and the Mediterranean countries that had been unable to solve the crisis, 
the crisis management in the period of 2010–2011 moved away from 
wide-range activities and indirect interventions targeted at public finance 
towards more reserved governmental activities. 
The EU-10 countries were also able to consolidate their situations; 
contrary to earlier steps, they employed mostly 2–3 crisis management 
measures that typically have been restricted to the field of energy or 
general consumption taxes. At the same time, budgetary austerity 
measures and the protection of the labour market invariably prevailed. 
Estonia introduced exemplary restrictions as a result of its rapid growth 
after 2010. 
The characteristic feature of the EU-10 crisis management was that, 
although with a delay compared to the Northern and Western countries of 
the EU, it also resorted to deficit reduction. Among the latter group of 
countries, this approach was more characteristic in the first period of the 
crisis, and both the efficiency and magnitude have been more favourable. 
However, while savings and restrictive measures contribute to the 
reduction of national debt, without additional, balancing steps such 
measures involved the risk of entering a downward spiral of increasing 
recession. 
Budgetary measures impact fiscal sustainability through several 
channels: primarily, they affect the balance, followed by growth effects 
and long-term growth effects resulting from the increased trust of 
investors. In this respect, the ability to reach a consensus to introduce 
measures, and the consistency and predictability of these measures are 
important. In this respect, the Central and Eastern European countries 
followed a course that reflected a rather mixed picture, and the 
governments considered a lack of trust mostly as their heritage (Table 8-2). 
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6. Conclusions 
The present crisis is a mix of problems with global, regional and 
national origins, reflecting that all three components can be attributed to 
the fact that institutional systems were not able to keep up with the 
changes in the economy. The multifaceted character of the European 
Union, mostly as a result of the expansion of the organisation to the South 
and the East, has become more pronounced. This fact is expressed in 
differences such as level of development, economic and social structures, 
traditions and values, which are all connected to the present European 
crisis by intricate links; therefore, the solution to the crisis does not depend 
solely on new institutions and policies (Kiss 2011). 
Regarding the question of whether identities or differences were more 
dominant, we can state that with respect to the employed solutions, 
identities were more dominant than differences, also in the case of the 
later accessed Central and Eastern European countries. Differences have 
been present mostly around measures of interventions, the number of 
intervention areas, methods resorting to more “activist” interventions, 
individual solutions or more normative, careful approaches. 
At the eruption of the crisis in 2008 and in 2009, EU countries with 
reserves and resources opted for Keynesian, demand-oriented, anti-
cyclical economic policies that contributed to the growth of indebtedness, 
made debt financing more expensive, and resulted in growing budget 
shortfalls. 
One consensus on the issue is that inadequate management was one of 
the major reasons for the deepening of the crisis. These days, it seems that 
decision-making based on socio-economic research is absent at the level of 
governmental, global and regional institutions. The conceptual and 
strategic handling of the problems is missing in the “Mediterranean” and 
“Continental” group of EU member states.19 Mutually exclusive steps can 
often be observed, but such solutions reinforce rather than solve the crisis 
in the long run. Sustainable growth and monetary stability is not possible 
without the coherent implementation of reforms concerning the structure 
of public finance (Kovács 2011b). The definition of public tasks is a 
fundamental and conceptual issue, which is necessary on both national and 
EU levels. Budgetary savings should also be “sustainable” and have long-
term effects. 
                                                          
19 “Public finance expenditure overruns” is a relative concept: it shows to what 
extent governance is able to continuously maintain harmony between the available 
sources and the financed services to ensure the prevailing of social cohesion, either 
by meeting the growing social demand or not. 
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EU membership offered a certain (limited) protection against the 
direct, short-term consequences of the crisis. The imperfection of the 
integration framework has negatively influenced crisis management, 
which was not institutionalised (Carmoy and Combes 2011). The EU-27 
countries and the EU itself, as observed, have not been able to employ a 
preventive, proactive and theoretically well-founded crisis management. 
However, by 2012, the EU was mostly able to stabilise its position and, for 
the time being, show solidarity with countries that are in trouble and 
unable to renew their social and economic models or that are still 
struggling with the debt trap.20 The measures taken served the 
sustainability of the social and economic functioning on the EU level, and 
the chance remained that efficiency improvements and new growth would 
become reality, not only for certain groups of EU members but also for the 
whole union. 
Instead of welfare redistribution, sharing of risks and burdens were the 
characteristic features. Today, regarding the EU countries – with 
significant simplifications – two groups can be observed: one group 
consists of those countries that had been able to stabilise their respective 
positions with the help of strict restrictions, whereas the other group 
contains those countries that are either bankrupt or on the brink of 
bankruptcy due to the late introduction of correction measures or the lack 
of social-political conditions for the implementation of restrictions. 
The examined EU-10 countries belong more to the former group of 
countries that were able to stabilise their situations by resorting to strict 
fiscal restrictions, even though to a different degree and with different 
chances; they showed specific reactions related to government changes, 
followed occasional detours and used action scenario mixes that, in some 
cases, contained counterproductive elements. The chances of the EU-10 
regarding catching up have improved. The crisis had painted a gloomy 
picture, based on earlier experiences, in respect to the “outer circle” or a 
                                                          
20 The countries that received assistance were, in turn, former members of the EU. 
Unfortunately, there is little literature on what roles the dictate of political and 
economic interests have played in the enforcement of the common risks or to what 
extent considerations that focused on the development of the EU have influenced 
the decisions. Under these circumstances, it is a significant result that – for the 
time being – none of the new member states received assistance; although, this 
could also be explained by the relative low level of social services. In the case of 
Latvia and Romania, a financial safety net worth €1.7, respectively €12 billion was 
set up in 2009. Besides Hungary, Romania is currently also negotiating with 
international financial institutions and organisations on setting up a similar safety 
net worth €15 billion. In exchange, it will likely commit to the establishment of a 
system of responsible and sustainable budgetary processes (IMF 2009a, 2009b). 
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two-speed development (Farkas 2009). This group of countries has 
integrated more into the “core Europe” and the internal markets of the EU. 
The work force in those countries is well trained, and the legal 
environment for investments is mostly adequate. Poland, the Baltic States, 
Slovenia and, partly, due to geo-political reasons, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia are closer to the core; Hungary, due to the market integration and, 
lately, the reduction and maintenance of a lower budget shortfall, belongs 
also to the circle of the “Northern and Western Group” of the EU. 
Hungary, however, has not yet entered the road to consolidation regarding 
the predictability and functioning of its institutional systems or the steady 
financing of the public finance system. Regarding investments with a 
significant effect on growth, Hungary is lagging behind. As a 
consequence, the chance of Hungary catching up is closer to Romania and 
Bulgaria, which are two countries with very favourable indebtedness 
indicators.  
The conditions of the crisis made it obvious that maintaining public 
finance stability, boosting the economy and achieving sustainable 
development do not depend on the “appropriate mix or dosage” of 
economic rationalisations, which includes not only the taxation of 
restrictive and “relaxing” measures but also external and internal social 
adaptabilities, so-called quality adaptabilities, that cannot be quantified. 
Great self-discipline, restraint, patience and consensus seeking are 
required to ensure that endeavours to adjust to the changes are not 
distracted by the reflex to intervene immediately, resulting in improvised 
solutions. It is impossible to realise sound objectives if the tools are 
inappropriate, contradict each other, are unacceptable in the given socio-
economic environment, or do not reflect economic realities. At the same 
time, the decision on what is unfeasible, futile and destabilising, and what 
is right, will improve safety, and create sustainable value, is impacted by 
constant changes and balance-related problems, which, in today’s Europe, 
represent the greatest challenge. 
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